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In this thesis I consider the Bargaining Problem (Nash (1950)). In Chapter 1, I present a variation of the classical alternating offers bargaining game (Stahl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982)) and study how alternative specifications of the criticalMoreIn this thesis I consider the Bargaining Problem (Nash (1950)). In Chapter 1, I present a variation of the classical alternating offers bargaining game (Stahl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982)) and study how alternative specifications of the critical parameter, the cost of not reaching an agreement, affect the value of the sub-game perfect equilibria of this game. I show that the limiting SPE payoffs display two properties characterizing the two leading solutions in the cooperative approach. In particular, when the cost of disagreement is negligible the equilibrium payoffs satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and correspond to a non-symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash (1950)). When the disagreement cost is arbitrarily large, the equilibrium payoffs satisfy the axiom of Restricted Monotonicity and coincide with a non-symmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) and Peters and Tjis (1984)).-In Chapter 2, I provide a simple two-person bargaining game that supports in SPE monotonic cooperative solutions and apply this model to study the hold-up problem. This bargaining game allows either party to exclude the other from a negotiation and to consume the residual surplus. I prove that any form of competition that puts this ability in the hands of the person who values it the most gives rise to a monotonic solution.-In Chapter 3, I re-examine the axiomatic foundation of the bargaining problem. I develop a formal theory of the relationship between a bargaining solution and the strategically relevant information in a bargaining situation. In particular, the solution is allowed to depend on variables not directly affecting the set of feasible payoffs. Adopting the axiomatic method I characterize two solutions related to the classic solutions proposed by Nash (1950) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). Essays on bargaining. by Marco Fiaccadori